1 The West is a shorthand for Western Christendom. 2 For our purposes here, the Middle East includes, in addition to Turkey, Iran, and the entire Arab world, Iberia while governed by Muslims and the Balkans while under Turkish rule. 3 For a critical survey of major explanations, see Kuran, "Islam and Underdevelopment." 4 Panzac, "Maritime Trade, , finds that in the late-eighteenth century Ottoman exports to Europe as well as European imports into the Ottoman Empire were carried exclusively on European ships. He also finds that most of the merchants who carried out this inter-regional trade were European. For supportive statistics, see Issawi, "Entrepreneurial Class"; Inalcik, "Ottoman State," pp. 48-54; and Panzac, Commerce et Navigation. 5 Issawi, "Entrepreneurial Class"; Eldem, French Trade, esp. chap. 8; and Panzac, "Maritime Trade, " p. 193. 1 If one challenge of the social sciences is to account for the rise of the West, 1 another is to explain how the Islamic Middle East 2 became an underdeveloped region. 3 A major symptom of this decline was that Muslim merchants lost ground to Westerners, and eventually also to religious minorities living in their midst. By the nineteenth century, when much of the Middle East fell prey to European colonialism, the Muslim role in the region's trade with Western Europe had slipped to insignificance. 4 Moreover, many lucrative components of the Middle East's internal commerce had come to be dominated by local Christians and Jews. 5 While these patterns were not uniform across places or sectors, there is no serious disagreement over the general trends of interest here.
The nineteenth century saw the first systematic efforts to overhaul the Middle East's commercial infrastructure. These involved the replacement of Islamic institutions with ones of Western provenance, so they are aptly characterized as Westernization. One achievement of the period was the establishment of secular commercial courts that placed commerce outside the jurisdiction of Islamic courts. Another was the addition of joint-stock companies and corporations to the organizational forms available to 'Carriers of History'?"
8 Contemporary Islamists tend to characterize the local and foreign instigators of the Middle East's economic Westernization as cultural miscreants. My own argument offers a positive counterinterpretation of the institutional transplants in question. In responding to widely felt needs, Middle Eastern reformers of the nineteenth century initiated a long, still incomplete economic recovery. 4 distinguishes among self-enforcing, self-reinforcing, and self-destroying institutions. In the short run, a selfenforcing institution perpetuates itself as the expected actions of agents motivate and enable other individuals to follow the associated behavioral regularity. Such an institution is also self-reinforcing if it exhibits positive feedback, in other words, it expands the range of situations in which the behaviors in question are observed. Islamic partnerships constituted, we shall see, just such a self-reinforcing institution.
A self-enforcing institution is self-destroying if, while perpetuating itself in the short-run, it exhibits negative feedback by sowing the seeds of its own eventual demise. In the West, the partnership forms of the medieval period proved to be self-destroying.
The Westernization of Islamic economic practices is often attributed to top-down measures serving
European imperialism and implemented by leaders alienated from their own cultures. What frequently escapes notice is that mounting pressures from a wide range of market participants also played significant roles. At least in the economic sphere, the reforms of the nineteenth century were designed to meet the needs of investors unable to compete in the emerging modern economy. Their beneficiaries included nonMuslims whose forefathers had chosen to operate under Islamic law even when free to do business under alternative rules. They also included Muslims who considered the commercial institutions of classical Islam to have outlived their usefulness. 8 9 With one major exception, the waqf or pious foundation, classical Islamic law recognizes no economic entity consisting of a collectivity of individuals. But even the waqf lacked many freedoms of a corporation. See Kuran, "Public Goods under Islamic Law." 10 Davis, Corporations, vol. 2, Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory, chap. 20; and Ramseyer, "Corporate Law." 5
Islamic Partnerships
For an introduction to the relevant elements of Islamic law, let us step back to the tenth century-roughly the fourth century after the advent of Islam. By this time all critical elements of the Islamic legal system were in place. From the perspective of modern commercial practices, a striking feature of this system is the absence of the business corporation. 9 The distinguishing feature of a corporation is that it enjoys legal rights distinct from those of the individuals who comprise its membership. A corporation may make and remake its own internal rules. Enjoying legal personality, it may also possess property, sign contracts, file claims, and be represented in court. The debts of a corporation are not owed by its owners or workers as individuals. Its decisions do not require a consensus of its membership. Furthermore, precisely because it has a legal status of its own, it can live on after its initial members die or otherwise relinquish their rights and responsibilities.
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In the pre-modern Islamic world, economic ventures requiring the cooperation of two or more individuals were carried out not by corporations but by family enterprises or partnerships. In the case of long-distance trade, the typical pattern, especially when family affinity was not a factor, was for a sedentary investor to finance a merchant who accepted the task of conducting a commercial mission. When formed under Islamic law, such a single-venture partnership was known as mud~raba. Occasionally, the merchant would help finance the enterprise, or the investor would contribute to the work. In either case, the resulting 11 Udovitch, Partnership and Profit, covers the rules in detail.
12 Certain Qur'anic verses have been linked to the rules of Islamic partnership. The most commonly invoked verse is 62:10: "And when the prayer has ended, then disperse in the land and seek of Allah's bounty, and remember much, that ye be successful." But the implied associations are tenuous. The identified verses say nothing about the organization of trade. 13 H. Cohen, "Economic Background," table C-1, estimates that in the ninth and tenth centuries 75 percent of all the religious scholars living in Islam's Arab heartland earned a living primarily from business. Although most were artisans or producers, many participated in commerce as investors. Seven percent of the scholars in Cohen's sample earned a living exclusively from trade or moneylending. On the power merchants wielded during Islam's initial half-century, see also Ibrahim, Merchant Capital. 6 partnership went by the name of mush~raka or in~n. Whatever the exact arrangement, the partners split profits of the enterprise, if any, according to a predetermined formula. The merchant was not liable for any losses generated; his own business risk was limited to his expended labor. The term "Islamic commercial partnership," or simply "Islamic partnership" may be used to designate the class of contracts under consideration, including the variants just defined.
The rules for forming and executing Islamic partnerships were not developed from scratch. 11 The jurists who shaped them between the seventh and tenth centuries drew inspiration from the customs of regions already under Islamic rule. 12 Yet, they refined the rules they borrowed, largely to accommodate the needs of the mercantile class. Their sensitivity to the requirements of commerce is not surprising, because in this period many of the religious scholars (%ulam~') who served as jurists were themselves active in long-distance trade, most as investors, a few as merchants. 13 Although Islam's principal schools of law did not agree on every detail, their partnership rules by and large facilitated commerce. Moreover, the most widely followed school, the Hanafi school, was particularly eager to legitimize the prevailing mercantile customs. Remarkably, this exercise of mercantile power occurred about two centuries before the 14 Benson, "Spontaneous Evolution"; and Hunt and Murray, History of Business, chap. 4.
15 For example, the investor's share could be set at, say, 40 per cent if the merchant transported wheat but 60 percent if he chose to carry cloth. Udovitch, Partnership and Profit, Pryor, "Origins of Commenda, and Gedikli, Osmanli Sirket Kültürü, governments of North-Western Europe took to enacting commercial rules established by the "law merchant"-the voluntarily produced, adjudicated, and enforced rules of the merchant communities. 14 However, the Islamic rules underwent few subsequent changes. This could not have been due to an absolute barrier to modifying or reinterpreting Islamic law. Changes did occur in other areas, such as taxation and statecraft. If the rules of commerce remained more or less unchanged, one must explain why.
Several aspects of Islamic commercial partnerships require consideration. The parties to an Islamic partnership enjoyed considerable latitude in setting profit shares. A merchant could claim an advantage on the basis of intangibles such as reputation for honesty, geographic knowledge, and commercial expertise.
Likewise, an investor could constrain the merchant's mandate in order to lessen his risk from the venture (or her risk-a significant minority of the investors were women). In particular, it was possible to place geographic and temporal limitations on a mission, restrict the people with whom the merchant could trade, or make the profit shares contingent upon the merchant's choices. 15 In such ways, Islamic law bestowed religious approval on mercantile customs.
Anyone familiar with modern institutional scholarship will see these customs and the associated Islamic partnership rules as instruments for economizing on transaction costs. The partnership rules developed by the maritime cities of Italy, including the commenda (or societas maris), which is practically identical to the Islamic mud~raba, were undoubtedly motivated by similar considerations, namely, the 16 Lopez and Raymond, Medieval Trade, and Hunt and Murray, History of Business, 17 Udovitch, Partnership and Profit, If one contributed silver aspers, the other could not contribute Venetian ducats. 19 Gedikli, Osmanli Sirket Kültürü, efficient allocation of risks and expected returns. 16 Both the commenda and the mud~raba offered investors and merchants more flexibility than the closest contractual form found in the Talmud, the Jewish %isqa. For all its commonalities with other partnerships, the %isqa required equality between the investor and merchant in terms of either profit shares or shares of liability. Although Maimonides' (1135 Maimonides' ( -1204 codification of Jewish law, the Mishneh Torah, relaxed this condition, it still required the merchant to be liable for part of the principal; in addition, it required his profit share to exceed his share of liability. 17 One purpose of these restrictions was to promote fairness. But this objective often collided with the risk-return tradeoffs considered optimal by partnership members. It is noteworthy, then, that the shapers of Islamic law generally allowed the preferences of merchants and investors to trump the concerns about fairness that
Islam shares with other religions.
Islamic partnership law was inflexible, however, in its insistence that the principal consist of currency. Also, if more than one partner contributed to the principal, the currency had to be the same.
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Investing merchandise directly was prohibited, ostensibly to prevent unjust enrichment, more plausibly to forestall disagreement over the value of the initial investment and disputes over the division of profits.
Finally, the merchant's mission was considered incomplete until all merchandise bought on behalf of the partnership had been reconverted into the selected currency.
19 20 Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism, [43] [44] [45] [46] and Udovitch, Partnership and Profit, [63] [64] . For a general analysis of the role that these played under classical Islamic law, see Schacht, Introduction to Islamic Law, chap. 11 . 21 Udovitch, Partnership and Profit, p. 183; and Gedikli, Osmanli Sirket Kültürü, 263. 22 In any case, even if the ban on investing merchandise was always violated, it need not have been inconsequential. In seeking to overcome its inconveniences through roundabout ways, partnerships incurred additional transaction costs. The anticipation of these costs may well have deterred the formation of some potentially profitable partnerships. There could also have been dynamic consequences favorable to commerce. All else equal, the greater the inconveniences of establishing a partnership, the larger were the incentives to develop alternative institutions.
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Insofar as these rules were followed, they imposed a burden on investors driven to sell merchandise where the price was low. True, as in other economic contexts, traders could use legal devices (hiyal) that allowed the circumvention of inconvenient rules.
20 By one such device, the sedentary investor would sell his goods to a trusted third-party and pass the proceeds to the impending partnership's traveling member;
and the latter would then repurchase the same goods on behalf of the now-constituted partnership. This procedure was obviously designed to accomplish in two individually legitimate steps a task that would violate Islamic law if performed through a single step. 21 Although this and functionally similar legal devices saw frequent use, there are also many examples of partnerships consistent with the spirit of the law.
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In an Islamic partnership, obligations arising from dealings almost always fell on the individual partners rather than on the enterprise as a whole. A person who performed services for the partnership had to collect from each partner separately. Likewise, injured third parties could press claims only against partners with whom they had direct dealings, although a partner who settled a claim might seek restitution from his fellows according to their shares of liability. The same principle applied to the partnership's own claims against third parties. Its members could demand compensation as individuals, never as a collective 23 Udovitch, Partnership and Profit, [98] [99] [100] [101] . The sole exception to these rules arose with the unlimited commercial partnership (muf~wada). This contract required complete equality among partners in all financial matters. Accordingly, each member was considered partially liable for the actions of the others. To third parties, therefore, it was equivalent to a single person. In this one respect, the unlimited partnership resembled a corporation. This hardly means, however, that it constituted a likely starting point for the indigenous emergence of corporate law. Precisely because of its equality requirement, it never gained popularity. Besides, not even through unanimous agreement could its members modify their rules of operation. 24 Each of these terms has assumed many meanings. By "joint-stock company" I mean an enterprise whose capital is held in transferable shares of stock by its joint owners. As defined in the introduction, a "corporation" is an enterprise that is legally recognized as a separate entity enjoying rights and liabilities distinct from those of its members. The critical distinction between a joint-stock company and a partnership is that the former's shares are transferable. The corporation differs from both in being recognized as a juridical person. 25 Gedikli, Osmanli Sirket Kültürü, partner thus increased the risk of premature liquidation, so there were advantages to keeping partnerships small and limiting their planned duration. The added vulnerabilities of large partnerships were doubtless understood by third parties, who would have charged a premium to serve them. Still another obstacle to large Islamic partnerships was that they lacked legal personality. Third parties had to deal with partners as individuals rather than as representatives of an entity with legal standing. Accordingly, they would avoid providing services beyond the financial capacity of the particular partner with whom they were dealing. In principle, these limitations could have been surmounted by incorporating the enterprise. But this option was blocked by the simple fact that classical Islamic law harbors no concept akin to the corporation.
To put these observations in perspective, note that a modern economy harbors firms with thousands of employees. Each such employee acts daily on behalf of an organization that may be sued and is expected to outlive its workers and shareholders. If the employees of even a modest modern firm were made 30 Nothing prevented the renewal of a successful trade mission. But even the longest-lasting cooperative commercial effort was terminated by the retirement or death of any partner. 31 Çizakça, Business Partnerships, and Gedikli, Osmanli Sirket Kültürü, pp. 237, 254, 259. 32 Steensgaard, Carracks, Caravans and Companies, chap. 1; and Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilization, esp. chap. 10 . The latter source (p. 205) reviews a commercial letter written by an Egyptian investor of the eleventh century. The letter refers to merchants carrying goods on the 13 personally liable for obligations incurred through their actions, they would find the risks intolerable.
Consequently, they would discourage the firm from making long-term commitments. In any case, the firm itself would have difficulty finding outsiders willing to do business. Mindful of the costs of collecting from individual employees and of the meagerness of most personal portfolios, third parties would insist on advance payment for their services. Moreover, the firm could borrow only for minuscule periods, lest a death or retirement void its contracts.
What is critical is that the Islamic partnership was poorly suited to large and long-lasting business ventures requiring the active or passive participation of many people. Not surprisingly, the typical Islamic partnership consisted of just two members, who pooled their resources for a single trade mission. Although the mission could last a year or two, ordinarily it ended within a matter of months. 30 True, mud~raba contracts with as many as 20 participants have been found. 31 But even in these exceptional cases, the agreement covered a single mission. As for the principal invested in the typical mission, it was quite small, because risk-averse investors tended to disperse their capital among multiple trade ventures. Consequently, even a merchant performing a trade mission financed by a dozen investors could be carrying merchandise of limited value. The participants in the caravan trade of the pre-industrial Middle East consisted largely of pedlars who bought and sold small quantities as the convoy moved from market to market. 32 Like the investor's behalf to various lands, suggesting that he had fragmented his investments.
33 Steensgaard, Carracks, Caravans and Companies, chap. 1; and Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilization, chaps. 9-10. 34 Ashtor, "Discussion on Udovitch," p. 549; and Gedikli, Osmanli Sirket Kültürü, p. 88. 35 Udovitch, "Institutions of Credit," p. 6. 14 caravan trade, maritime trade was the province of small traders traveling with packs and baskets that could be loaded on a single animal. Major commercial investors diversified their risks by contracting with many merchants traveling in different directions. 33 Surviving records point to merchants who commanded loads valued at many times those of a typical pedlar; many of them were financed by high-ranking officials.
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Significantly, even these elite merchants belonged to partnerships that tended to have few members. In any case, wealthy officials themselves pursued risk diversification, which meant that their resources got divided among many partnerships.
The pre-modern Middle East never lacked investors willing to risk capital in pursuit of financial
gain. Yet it did not develop organizations capable of pooling the resources of large numbers of investors.
This failure was hardly predictable early on. In the early Islamic centuries the Middle East was teeming with money changers, moneylenders, and pawnbrokers, along with "merchant bankers" who, in the course of their commercial activities, accepted deposits, provided credit, intermediated payments through the delegation of credit (haw~la) and bills of exchange similar to modern checks (suftajas). These financial operations took on "fairly complex forms" as early as the mid-eighth century, observes Abraham Udovitch, "at least three or four centuries before anything comparable is recorded for medieval Europe." 35 So in the early Islamic centuries one might have expected modern banking to emerge in the Middle East. Yet, 36 Udovitch, "Bankers without Banks," p. 272. 37 Greif, "Cultural Beliefs," offers a complementary explanation centered on self-fulfilling perceptions of commercial norms. As things turned out, Middle Eastern financiers refrained from forming financial intermediaries 38 A complementary reason for the delay may have been the persistence of Islam's formal commitment to the eradication of interest. Whereas an individual might conceal dealings in interest through undocumented stratagems, a bank expected to keep standardized accounts will have a harder time disguising the nature of its operations. By this logic, wherever the interest ban was enforced even partially, a reluctance to publicize dealings in interest would have weakened the incentive to form large financial intermediaries. 39 Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade, chap. 9; Kévonian, "Marchands Arméniens"; and Matthee, Trade in Safavid Iran, capable of supporting large ventures of indefinite duration. The reasons are analogous to those that account for the persistent smallness of commercial partnerships. The requirement of disbanding a financial partnership at the death of any depositor or borrower raised the cost of running financial intermediaries.
It also hampered their growth.
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Institutional Comparison with the West
Examining the West European and Islamic records between the eighth and twelfth centuries-the period Udovitch associates with Islamic financial creativity-one finds no significant differences in regard to business scale or longevity. Nor does one encounter specialized organizations identifiable as banks. Neither observation is surprising, for the commenda was no more hospitable to large and durable enterprises than the mud~raba.
Moving forward in time, we encounter striking organizational differences. The Islamic world saw the emergence of ethnically based networks that coordinated activities in various cities. In the seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries, prominent among these was an Armenian network centered in Iran. 39 In terms of wealth and influence, however, the commercial networks of the Islamic world achieved nothing comparable to the business conglomerates formed in Western Europe. More critical, they consisted of family firms that cooperated episodically rather than under the aegis of a centralized organization. Prior to its reforms of the nineteenth century, the Middle East did not produce even one indigenous joint-stock company. As Murat Çizakça observes, before the modern era it did not produce a single case of mass financial mobilization through non-governmental channels for a major business venture. 40 In 1908 a Turkish commentator would write: "Let us say that somehow we managed to put together 3000 liras and built a fez factory. How could we possibly compete against Austrian factories whose capital is measured in hundreds 45 Roover, Bruges, and Roover, Medici Bank, esp. chap. 5 . 46 Usher, Deposit Banking, chaps. 1, 4.
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were forming partnerships for periods of several years, rather than for predefined ventures, the prevalent pattern in the Middle East. These new partnerships did not dissolve with the death of a partner. Although they all started as family associations, many metamorphosed into enterprises whose family members contributed only a minority of the capital and were consistently outnumbered by outside shareholders. 44 Moving forward a century, we come across business enterprises consisting of linked partnerships.
Headquartered in Florence, the famous Medici enterprise combined many separate partnerships, each a separate legal entity that dealt with the others on the same basis as with outside customers, charging them commissions and interest. One partnership served as a command center, the rest as tributaries. The tributary partnerships reported to the center, which coordinated their activities to make them operate, in effect, as branches of a single enterprise. 45 The key implication is that the dissolution of one partnership through a death or retirement left the rest of the enterprise intact. The Medici enterprise thus foreshadowed the modern holding company. Among its innovations was the facilitation of clearance operations among tributary partnerships.
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The period from the sixteenth century to the early-nineteenth century saw further developments.
Among the new organizational forms was the joint-stock company, which was a partnership with transferable shares. Joint-stock companies could have many members-some had hundreds-so reorganization became a daily matter. Courts took steps to simplify the reorganization process, thus 47 This is not the place for a detailed account of Europe's organizational evolution. For our purposes, the critical point is that the West managed to develop a panoply of new organizational forms, including ones suited to pooling large amounts of capital for multiple commercial missions. In the process, Western business communities gradually overcame the obstacles to growth and longevity that continued to limit commercial enterprises in other parts of the world, including the Middle East. By no means, of course, were
Europe's new organizational forms free of drawbacks. One member of a large partnership could impose losses on all the rest. Moreover, a joint-stock company had no legal identity independent of the people who made it up; every partner became a party to legal suits by and against third parties, and also to suits 51 Harris, Industrializing English Law, esp. p. 144. 52 On the evolution of the business corporation, its significance for European economic growth, and its advantages over partnerships, see Harris, Industrializing English Law, esp. chaps. 2 and 5; and Lamoreaux, "Partnerships, Corporations." 21 between other partners. 51 Although the consequent costs could be reduced by constraining the freedoms of individual partners, it was hardly practical to micro-manage every partner.
In any case, Europe had long known an alternative organizational form that avoided the serious drawbacks of the joint-stock company: the corporation. Employed since the medieval era for municipal, educational, and ecclesiastical purposes, from the sixteenth century onward the corporation was used also for profit-oriented business. Eastern business concerns remain essentially fixed at a time when those in the West expanded steadily? For the answer, we must introduce a new consideration: differences between the Islamic inheritance system and the inheritance systems of the West.
The Islamic Inheritance System
Of all the economic rules in the Qur'an, the most detailed are those on inheritance. Restricting the individual's testamentary privileges to one-third of his or her estate, the Qur'an reserves the un-bequeathed portion to sons and daughters, spouses, parents and grandparents, brothers and sisters, and possibly even distant relatives, according to rules dependent on the exact composition of the legal heirs. For certain special cases, the applicable rule differs across the two major denominations and, within the Sunni denomination, across the principal schools of law. One difference concerns the right to bequeath property to a relative who is already an inheritor. Only under the Shiite interpretation may the testator make bequests to relatives already entitled to part of the estate.
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The degree to which the Islamic inheritance system departed from the norms of pre-Islamic Arabia 55 Powers, Qur'an and Hadith, finds similarities between the Islamic and Eastern Roman inheritance systems. He also shows that the Qur'anic verses on inheritance mark a smaller shift in Arabian practices than is usually presumed. For a survey of the debates, see Mundy, "Family, Inheritance, and Islam." 56 For example, a daughter received half as much as a son, and the mother of the decedent received half as much as the father. 57 Baer, Landownership in Modern Egypt, 23 is a matter of controversy. 55 Whatever the extent of historical continuity, the imposed testamentary restrictions clearly subordinated the individual's personal preferences to the extended family's need for financial security and predictability. Also clear is that they strengthened the inheritance rights of female family members. Although a female heir's entitlement normally amounts to only half that of a male in the same class of inheritors, 56 in seventh-century Arabia this right enhanced the economic security and social status of women.
It is frequently noted that the Islamic inheritance system tended to equalize the distribution of wealth.
Another common observation is that at least its Sunni variants reduced intra-family tensions by preventing wills from favoring certain heirs. More significant here is that the system's mandatory sharing rules made it difficult to keep property intact across generations. A study on Egyptian landownership trends during the early-twentieth century documents the fragmentation of arable land into uneconomically-sized plots through the combined effect of population growth and the Islamic inheritance system. 57 Likewise, studies of premodern Syria and Palestine show that fortunes often got fragmented. It was not uncommon for a dwelling or shop to have more than a dozen co-owners. Moreover, the sudden death of a wealthy person was often followed by complicated lawsuits, as family members and business partners fought over the estate's 58 Marcus, Middle East, pp. 209-10; Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, pp. 70-71; and Meriwether, Kin Who Count, chap. 4. 59 Kunt, Sultan's Servants, From the early days of Islam, Middle Eastern rulers became acutely aware of the efficiency losses and the reductions in tax revenue caused by property fragmentation. Accordingly, Islamic jurisprudence sought to limit this fragmentation by classifying most arable land as state property (initially ard al-mamlaka; under the Ottomans, miri). The cultivators of state-owned land enjoyed tenancy rights and paid the land tax in return. However, they could not sell, grant, or endow their plots. While their use rights could ordinarily be passed on to descendants, the land itself was not subject to inheritance rules, and generally it could not be partitioned (A. Cohen, "M §r §"; Inalcik, "Land Problems"; and Cuno, Pasha's Peasants, chap. 4). When and where rulers were able to enforce their will, this measure kept farms as viable production units. But it did not prevent the fragmentation of other property, and it is movable wealth that is of primary interest here. The wealth of a commercial partner would consist partly of cash and merchandise. At least to that extent, it was subject to Islamic inheritance rules. 24 distribution.
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The difficulty of keeping wealth undivided is also evident in statistics concerning the intergenerational transmission of wealth. Research on prosperous Ottoman families of the sixteenth-century show that their descendants rarely remained wealthy beyond one or two generations. In contrast to Europe, no major aristocracies developed in either Turkey or the Arab world. Although the prevailing inheritance system was not the only factor at work-expropriations and opportunistic taxation were also significant-what matters is that it contributed to wealth fragmentation. In regard to enforcement of the Islamic inheritance rules, wealthy Ottomans, including the military-administrative elites, were treated more or less like ordinary Ottoman subjects.
59
Just as the law of Islamic partnerships was sometimes circumvented, so Islamic inheritance practices often diverged from the relevant rules. Successive Middle Eastern regimes took measures to limit the fragmentation of agricultural land. 60 In certain places local norms allowed families to deny women their 61 61 The last method was made possible by the Qur'an's lack of specificity about when the division had to occur. The resulting ambiguity permitted powerful men to keep estates intact for years, even decades, without formally denying legal heirs their rights. 62 Still another method for keeping property undivided was to convert it into a waqf, or "Islamic trust." A waqf was statutorily indivisible, and its beneficiaries could include or exclude anyone the founder desired. So establishing a waqf allowed the selection of who would control a property after one's death.
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Of course, to identify opportunities for circumventing a law is not to establish that law's irrelevance or to prove that the opportunities were available to everyone. Take the last circumvention method.
Because the scale of mercantile activities was generally quite limited, few merchants became wealthy enough to establish a foundation. In any case, ordinarily setting up a waqf was not costless; although the relevant norms varied, founders were usually expected to commit substantial resources to charity. The option of postponing the estate's distribution could present another problem. Some groups of heirs lacked a powerful person capable of consolidating control over the estate and resisting demands for its immediate 64 Kuehn, "Inheritance,"pp. 454-61; and Platteau and Baland, "Impartible Inheritance," esp. sects. 2-3. 65 Thirsk, "European Debates on Inheritance." 26 division.
Since our challenge is to explain why the Middle East's merchants and financiers lost ground to Westerners, let us now consider the inheritance practices of pre-modern Europe. These practices exhibited bewildering diversity, partly because of Europe's political fragmentation. But there could be major variations even within a politically unified region as small as Moravia or Lower Saxony. Moreover, rules and customs could change over a matter of decades. Given this remarkable variability, it is unsurprising that medieval Europe developed certain inheritance systems that were as inflexible as the most rigid Islamic variants. In parts of England, one-third of a deceased man's movable property was reserved for his wife and another third for his children, who had to be treated equally. Under medieval Germanic law, a father had no testamentary powers at all; the post-mortem disposition of his property followed a fixed formula.
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For all their variations, practically every inheritance system of pre-modern Europe differed from the Islamic system in two critical respects. First, none defined the family as broadly as the Qur'an does.
Usually the legal heirs were limited to the nuclear family. Second, because Christian canon law did not standardize inheritance requirements, practices were relatively easy to modify, and attempts at reform were unlikely to be resisted as sacrilegious. People on all sides of the issue found it easy to give Biblical justifications for their positions. 65 Barriers to keeping estates intact across generations were thus considerably lower in relation to the Middle East, where it was risky to challenge the authority of the Qur'an, especially on a matter it addressed explicitly. 66 From the Middle Ages to recent times, the unIslamic-and un-modern-devices of primogeniture (the preference in inheritance given to the oldest son) and ultimogeniture (the preference given to the youngest son) enjoyed legal recognition in many parts of Europe. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when Western merchants were gaining increasing control over their trade with the Middle East, primogeniture was the dominant inheritance practice in Britain, the Low Countries, Scandinavia, and parts of Austria and France. 67 In the late seventeenth century, over a few decades, the practice spread also within Germany. 68 This continent-wide trend allowed huge numbers of wealthy families to keep their assets intact without resorting to such costly methods as establishing a waqf.
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Static Institutional Consequences
If Middle Easterners found it unduly costly to prevent the fragmentation of mercantile wealth, we might expect this handicap to have stimulated institutional experimentation. Instead, and as we shall now see, it made Middle Easterners less eager to find ways of increasing the size and complexity of their businesses.
As a step toward identifying the dynamic processes at work, it will be instructive to compare the probable consequences of a partner's death in two particular jurisdictions: one that allows primogeniture and one that does not. In the Middle East, then, the probability of premature dissolution is particularly high. A further problem is that each heir's entitlement is to a prescribed fraction of every asset in the estate, movable or immovable. 70 Remember that contributions to an Islamic commercial partnership must be in currency, and its dissolution requires the liquidation of all of its tangible assets. In principle, an heir may force the sale of any good owned at the time of death, in order to receive his proper share of its net worth. In the absence of indivisibilities, an impatient heir's demand for immediate settlement might be met by liquidating only his own share of each good. However, a partial liquidation may force the surviving partners to seek additional funding. In any case, indivisibilities were not unusual; a partnership's assets sometimes included items such as slaves and livestock. So partners could well be forced to make sales at inconvenient times and places.
Consider a five-person partnership established in a European
The number of heirs was not always large. If a merchant died intestate, and he was survived by one wife and a single son, his heirs would be limited to two, with the wife entitled to an eighth of his estate and the son to the remaining seven eighths. Yet, successful and wealthy merchants-precisely those who might have pressured the courts to recognize increasingly complex commercial organizations-ordinarily had 71 Meriwether, Kin Who Count, pp. 94-95.
72 Gedikli, Osmanli Sirket Kültürü, . 73 Marcus, Middle East, pp. 209-10. 74 Marcus, Middle East, p. 113. While Marcus mentions this possibility in relation to shares in real estate, it applies also to shares in a commercial partnership. 30 larger households, because they tended to have more children and were more likely to have multiple wives. 71 And it is in cases involving large estates that the wealth at stake made it worthwhile to launch a lawsuit. Reviewing the court records of Galata, Istanbul from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Fethi
Gedikli finds numerous suits by heirs demanding their shares of a prematurely dissolved partnership's assets. 72 Some of the merchants included in these records had so many heirs as to make serious fragmentation inevitable.
In the same vein, Abraham Marcus points to two eighteenth-century merchants based in Aleppo.
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The fortune of the first was split among his wife and thirteen children from consecutive marriages; and that of the second was divided among his four concurrent wives, seven sons, and six daughters. When the decedent had no surviving sons, many secondary relatives could gain entitlements. Cases reviewed by
Marcus illustrate the possibilities: wife and four nephews; sister, uncle, and aunt; sister and three sons of a cousin; wife, two sisters, and seven cousins; wife, daughter, maternal grandmother, and two sisters. Nor need the rights generated by a partner's death be limited to his own kin. Since co-owners could sell or pledge their shares, the surviving members of a lapsed partnership might be confronted with persons unknown to their deceased ex-partner.
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Could the dangers of premature dissolution have been lowered by sticking to family businesses?
After all, cooperation is achieved more easily within families than among non-relatives, which is why family businesses are common even today. But one must not exaggerate their durability within the milieu of concern here. In the pre-modern Middle East prosperous merchants often invested in land, so successful commercial businesses often died with their founders. In any case, we should not lose sight of the reason for focusing on partnerships, which may be formed between non-relatives. Cooperative ventures can pool vastly greater resources by crossing family boundaries. This is why it has made sense to focus on mud~raba.
Where mud~raba differs from its close Western counterpart, the commenda, is that the costs of re-starting a mud~raba are higher. A death could force the liquidation of an Islamic partnership that would easily be reconstituted if it had been formed in a European region subject to primogeniture. In the Islamic world, then, the incentive to form large partnerships would have been weaker than in Western Europe. By the same token, the willingness to make long-term commercial commitments would have been relatively more limited.
If costs are borne by surviving members of a partnership that loses a member, it follows that, regardless of the prevailing inheritance regime, anything that shortens expected life spans will diminish the attractiveness of large partnerships. So it is that in Tuscany average partnership size shrank temporarily during the Black Death. Here is an explanation by Edwin Hunt and James Murray: "[H]igh mortality from the recurring plagues made long-term commercial associations very tenuous, especially when many heirs had become more interested in spending their inheritance than in perpetuating the business. 75 To this one may add that the risks of expanding a partnership depend, in addition to natural factors, on the prevailing inheritance system. Varying the inheritance system, with mortality held constant, will yield an inverse relationship between average partnership size and the difficulty of keeping property undivided. A society that encourages wealth fragmentation will have smaller partnerships than one that provides ways to avoid it.
Dynamic Consequences
To understand why the Middle East's commerce with the West fell increasingly under Western domination, we need to explore the dynamic consequences of the identified differences among Western and Islamic inheritance regimes.
The larger and more durable partnerships of Europeans unavoidably generated problems of their own, and the ensuing responses extended well beyond the accommodation of impatient heirs. To track resource flows and facilitate coordination, it became necessary to develop sophisticated accounting systems. Increases in the volume of shares changing hands induced the emergence of formal equity markets, which then made it easier to raise new capital. Larger and longer-lasting partnerships instigated the creation of hierarchical control systems to economize on deliberation and decision costs. To list all the adaptations that turned Europe into a financial and commercial power house remains, of course, outside our purview.
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Suffice it to say that each of the European innovations reviewed earlier-linked partnerships, conglomerates, joint-stock companies-contributed to the organizational complexity of the modern global economy.
The commenda, like the general partnership in use in medieval Northern Europe, turned out, then, to be a self-destroying institution. In creating opportunities for wealth creation, it also set the stage for enterprises of greater size, scope, and durability. And the resulting complex partnerships generated new problems, which fueled further organizational innovations. Not that every new organizational form met immediately with sweeping approval. As in other contexts, vested interests put up resistance. For example, the British crown long inhibited the formation of business corporations by making it expensive to obtain a corporate charter, and existing corporations opposed new ones to limit competition. But with every new organizational form, as its advantages grew, adoptions eventually spread. In turn, these successes prepared its destruction by stimulating a need for institutions conducive to even larger and even more complex business enterprises.
The persistently small partnerships of the Middle East did not face the accounting, coordination, and liability problems that demanded innovative solutions in Europe. So the Islamic inheritance system effectively closed off one path to economic modernization. In principle, of course, the Middle East could have developed modern organizational forms through some alternative path. Perhaps the most obvious alternative to the modernization path actually followed-the wholesale adoption of institutions born in Europe-would have involved liberalizing the inheritance rules that 77 Goitein, Mediterranean Society: Abridgment, p. 190. 35 constrained enterprise growth and durability. However, the explicitness of the Qur'anic provisions on inheritance assured that they would not be openly questioned or resisted, except in a grave crisis.
For many centuries, therefore, all these alternative paths remained paths not taken. While the commenda's successes undermined its own viability, not even the failures of the mud~raba induced fundamental institutional changes in the Islamic Middle East. On the contrary, the mud~raba turned out to be a self-reinforcing institution. Indeed, by spreading to regions beyond Islam's heartland, it limited the trading emporia in which Middle Eastern traders encountered difficulties. The resulting organizational stagnation prevented Middle Eastern merchants from remaining competitive with their Western counterparts. As late as the sixteenth century, it should be noted, the resulting gap in commercial capabilities remained small. However, it was bound to grow.
As already mentioned, around the tenth century the West and the Middle East had functionally more or less identical commercial institutions. What differed was the inheritance system and the legal system's openness to corporations. Why these differences in institutional pre-conditions? In particular, why did the Islamic inheritance system rule out primogeniture while European laws proved flexible enough to allow it? And why did the founders of Islam's legal schools not leave room for corporate entities? S. D.
Goitein offers a plausible answer to the first puzzle. 77 In ancient Western Arabia, the birthplace of the Islamic inheritance system, most wealth belonged to traders and nomads whose possessions consisted of movable and easily partitioned goods, such as animal herds and cash. So the Islamic inheritance rules took 78 The details of the Islamic inheritance system were worked out over the next few centuries, with inputs from heavily agricultural societies. But its egalitarian principles endured, doubtless because they are spelled out in the Qur'an. 36 shape in a society unconcerned with asset fragmentation.
78 By contrast, the Roman and Germanic legal systems, the founts of the Western institutions of concern here, developed in agricultural societies whose members sought to keep land in units large enough to sustain a family. As for why Islamic law turned out to be thoroughly individualistic, a key factor was probably the factionalism that created the Sunni-Shiite rift just a few decades after Islam's emergence. Fearing further divisions, the jurists may have endeavored to keep factions weak by denying them opportunities for achieving legal standing as collectivities.
Perhaps small events-intrinsically insignificant events that would not have left historical traces-helped to close off certain evolutionary paths. But whatever the full explanation for the differences in pre-conditions, they clearly had unintended and unforeseeable long-term consequences. Most critical here, for all its virtues, including the brakes it put on hereditary inequality, the Islamic inheritance system dampened incentives to enlarge partnerships. A further ominous consequence was the absence of institutional advances that would have allowed large enterprises to form and operate efficiently.
Comparison with Received Explanations
There have been other attempts to explain why the Islamic world lost economic ground to the West. Until the mid-twentieth century, a popular explanation was that Islam defines a timeless, closed, and unadaptable economic system. By this account, the fixity of Islamic law blocked the organizational adaptations necessary If the Islamic inheritance system did indeed help to give the Islamic commercial system a selfreinforcing character, might the religious minorities have escaped the consequences of this stagnation? After all, their "choice of law" applied with special force to inheritance, considered a matter of personal status.
In principle, moreover, the inheritance systems of the minorities could have shown the same variations found in Europe. There was no legal obstacle to the use of primogeniture among, say, the Greeks. Yet, the inheritance practices of non-Muslim subjects resembled those of Muslims. This was because anyone, regardless of faith, could challenge an inheritance arrangement in an Islamic court. Mindful of this right, which disgruntled Christians and Jews routinely exercised, minority families took care to accommodate their members who might demand an Islamic settlement. For instance, a daughter would receive a share of her father's estate, lest she seek redress in an Islamic court. Consequently, fragmentation was as much a threat to enterprises owned by non-Muslims as it was to ones of Muslims.
The foregoing pattern started to change significantly only in the eighteenth century, when huge numbers of Christians and Jews became protégés of one European power or another, largely to benefit from the growing competitive advantages conferred by Western laws. As protégés, they gained the ability to use consular courts operated by European functionaries familiar with Western legal developments. The consular courts enforced formal insurance contracts, recognized judicial personalities, made room for lawyers, and attached evidentiary value to documents even in the absence of corroborating oral testimony.
In addition, they were accustomed to dealing with large and complex organizations, including joint-stock companies and corporations. In all these respects, the traditional Islamic courts, which did not recognize any of the new organizational forms, were at best unreliable.
The region's Muslim merchants-Turks, Arabs, Persians, and others-might also have started changing jurisdiction. They could observe that the religious minorities were gaining ground in local commerce and finance, and also that they were making inroads into the trade with Europe. But jurisdictional switches by Muslims would have entailed a huge break with the time-honored legal tradition that denied them the choice of law available to religious minorities. Hence, their only realistic option was to demand modern commercial courts, in the expectation that new legal opportunities would enable them to overcome their handicaps. In the nineteenth century, at a time when political and military weaknesses made local statesmen increasingly receptive to reforms, the Middle East entered a new legal era with the creation of essentially secular commercial courts in Istanbul, Alexandria, and Cairo. These new courts, which were followed by others, did not instantly restore the competitiveness of merchants accustomed to doing business under Islamic law. For one thing, the new courts did not become proficient overnight. For another, precisely because of past institutional handicaps, few Muslim merchants possessed adequate financial and human capital.
Evidently, the long stagnation of Islamic commercial law had reduced its appeal to profit-seeking merchants. Individuals signal something about the relative efficiency of alternative legal systems when they walk away from one and embrace another.
Conclusion
Economic history is replete with unanticipated long-term consequences, both good and bad. Islamic concept of corporation blocked alternative paths to economic modernization.
Given the important role that Islamic law played in the economic life of the pre-modern Middle East, it is hardly surprising to find that it contributed to the region's economic frustrations. But the underlying mechanisms have never been clear. Part of the explanation, we have seen, lies in certain organizational constraints that Islamic law imposed on economic life. Another part, also critical, is that the legal systems of the West allowed greater opportunities for organizational advances. It is the resulting divergence of civilizational paths that turned Islamic law into a commercial handicap.
